This paper reviews recent evidence on black economic progress. It notes that while relative status increased over the period 1965-1981, absolute differentials in real earnings between blacks and whites widened over this period. The paper goes out to summarize recent studies of the impact of government on the economic status of black Americans. Educational policy has a strong effect. The evidence on affirmative action programs is mixed. There is an intrinsic bias in the methods used toward finding no effect of affirmative action programs. Selection bias effects do not account for more than 10-12% of measured wage growth of black males.
stimulated the sluggish economy. They proclaimed that this success gave tangible evidence of a new era in which they could "fthe-tune" the economy and was viewed as the social science counterpart of the critical experiment in science.
Subsequent events have shown how false this view was but in 1965 there was real optimism. Society could solve its problems--in particular it could solve the problem of the inferiority of blacks in the American economy.
The Kennedy-Johnson administration launched a War on Poverty. Many civil rights bills were passed and executive orders issued. The main features of the civil rights activity were:
(1) The 1964 Civil Rights Bill and related bills banning discrimination in employment, housing and voting. "Equal treatment of equals" became embodied in the law and voting rights were assured.
(2) "Affirmative action" programs for employment of minorities were begun--initially among larger firms and federal contractors. These programs encouraged firms to employ minority workers. This policy was instituted in recognition of the difficulty in overcoming historical discrimination patterns. Coincident with this activity was a coitment to a War on Poverty which had two main thrusts:
(1) Efforts were made to improve the skills of poor blacks (and other poor people) through (a) expansion of manpower training programs and (b) direct intervention in ghetto schools via bussing, through head start programs and the like.
(2) Many transfer programs were introduced or expanded. These programs were designed to transfer income to the less fortunate. By virtue of their more lowly position in the distribution of income, blacks were disproportionately represented in these programs. The mix of social 2 sp.nding shifted from training to transfers after initial dissatisfaction with the results of training programs.
Just as many economists took credit for the post-1962 improvement in the American economy, many social scientists proclaimed success for the Kennedy-Johnson policies aimed at elevating the economic status of blacks. At first glance, the evidence seemed clear. Although aggregate parity had riot been achieved, at least for black males, the social statistics seemed to indicate the initial success of the new programs.
The first indications suggested that these programs "worked." Consider, for example, Figure 1 . This figure shows three curves placed on the same diagram. These three curves trace out the ratio of the median income of black males, white females and black females, respectively to white male median income for full-time workers. Median income is the income that a person in the middle of an income distribution earns.
These figures tell an interesting story. The uppermost curve reveals a near stability in the black male income/white male income ratio pre-1965--1965 was the date that much of the Civil Rights legislation became operative--and a sharp upward jump after 1965. The lowest curve in that figure--for black females--tells a similar story for that group. Table 1 demonstrates the significant breakthrough that occurred in the occupational position of employed blacks. The proportion of the black workforce in the professional category expanded greatly. Measures of occupational similarity between blacks and whites show substantial unprecedented improvement in the period 1960-1970. Even more dramatic was the breakthrough in black employment in traditional segregated industries. Figure 3 displays the share of total employment held by white males white females, black males and black females in the South Carolina textile industry 3 eve: tzie per.O j-iQ. Fne textile industry is the largest industrial employer in the state. Total employment itt the industry continued to expand until the mid 70's. Its racial employment pattern is typical of that of many "traditional" southern industries. Skill requirements are low in the industry.
There is a large black population in the state--both relatively and absolutely-throughout this period.
The topmost curve or line in Figure 3 displays the share of total employment held by white males. The curve or line second from the top displays the share of total employment held by white females. The bottom curve presents the share of black females and the curve just above it presents the share of black males.
It is evident from this char: that the share of white males is roughly constant at 60%. It declines during World War II but is offset by an expansion of white female employment.
Through two World Wars, the Korean War, the 1920's boom and the Great Depression the proportion of blacks itt the industry is low and stable. The black female share is virtually zero. For black men the share is less than 10% despite the fact that the black share in the total population is closer to 40%.
In the post 1965 Vietnam era, textile plants were natural targets of federal contract compliance programs. Sales to the federal government in the form of materials for uniforms and the like were sizable. (The total volume of sales to the government by South Carolina firms increased from $20,000,000 in 1965 to roughly $120,000,000 in 1966 as the Vietnam build up began). In many counties of the state, textile employment was the principal industrial employment and was a visible target for federal civil rights activity. The share of black employment--and the level--increased dramatically after 1965. By 1970, the industry was roughly 30% black whereas before 1965 it was less than 10% black. While especially dramatic, the story of the textile industry is fairly 4 cypLcaJ. o ocrier "traditional" southern industries. Penetration rates for blacks rose. Moreover, as black political power rose as measured by registration in the South, so did black employment in government (Table 2) . It is this and other evidence that led many scholars of American racial relations to declare the success of the Kennedy-Johnson policies. Richard Freeman of
Harvard wrote in 1973 that
While black-white differences have not disappeared, the convergence in economic position (of blacks) . . . suggests a virtual collapse in traditional discriminatory patterns" (Freeman 1973, page 67).
He continues on in the same article to write
Much of the improvement in black economic position that took place in the late 60s appears to be the result of governmental and related antidisciminatory activity associated with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.. .More education for blacks and the general boom of the period cannot account for the sharp increase in relative incomes and occupational position of blacks after 1964. (bc. c.t. , page 119) Writing in Commentary magazine in the same year--1973--Benjamin Waccenberg and Richard Sca=on described the success of the Kennedy-Johnson social program in the following terms:
.A better deal has been given to the poor and black to the point where many of them are now in the middle class just as the Presidential pledges and legislation promised. ... To be sure, we cannot say absolutely that the legislation was totally respor.sible for the progress made but we can say absolutely that it was crucial. Liberalism worked. (ac:enberg and Scammon, 1973) From the perspective of 1985 these claims seem exaggerated to some and absurd to others. Writing in 1984 in an influential book that has been described as the "Bible of the Second Reagan Administration" conservative author Charles Murray writes in his influential book Losing Crour.d that 5
As tne Sturm und Drang of the 1960's faded and we settled into the 1970s, the realization gradually spread things were getting worse, not batter, for blacks and poor people in this country... the inner cities were more violent and ravaged than ever before.. .it was difficult to take much satisfaction in the legal edifice of black rights when teenage unemployment was approaching 40 per cent. (page 145, Losthz Ground)
Elsewhere in his monograph he writes
If an impartial observer from another country were shown the statistics on the black lower class from 1950 to 1980 but given no information about the contemporaneous changes in society or public policy, the observer would infer that racial discrimination against the black poor increased dramatically during the late 1960s and 1970s (Losinz Ground, page 221) The consequences of (affirmative action] were disastrous... for poor blacks especially. (Losing Ground, page 223). There is some evidence that supports this less optimistic view of black status. Co back to Figure 1 . The lower right hand side of that figure shows that the absolute difference in income for all minority groups taken with 6 espec: o n.ce ma4.es an measured n inflation constant dollars widened in the 60s. The gap remains sizable today. Figure 2 presents this evidence in a different way and reveals that while black incomes rose, so did white incocies and absolute gaps did not converge between racial groups. Figure 8 is a key exhibit in this article. It charts the growth over tiie in the labor force dropout rate--those not looking for work or at work--among prime age males 25-54. This age group has traditionally had a near zero rate of dropping out of the work force. For both race groups, the dropout rate has grown but the rate of growth has been much more rapid for blacks. By 1982, fully 12% of prime age black males in the civilian population were not attached to the work force.
Summarizing his study, he recoends
A complete accounting of the status of blacks must reckon with this phenomenon. A recent history of black progress that focuses only on the improvement of demand conditions in the labor market for blacks cannot account for the growth in black dropout rates. These figures are mirrored in high and growing unemployment rates for blacks of all ages.
Not only is this dropout phenomenon a potential sign of distress in the black community but it also signals the possibility of an important problem cha: arises in comparing the earnings and occupational positions of blacks with whites. Earnings and occupation data are only collected for labor force participants. More precisely, the published wage and salary data count only those persons employed in one year who were also employed in March of the following year. As the fraction of blacks in the labor force declines and as more blacks enter the unstable marginal worker category and are excluded from the standard statistics, the available evidence on black status becomes increasingly unreliable since more blacks than whites are entering marginal status. One theme of this paper is that a substantial portion of the measured relative wage growth of black males is due to their differential rate of om.ss1.on trom cne pubi.snec stac.sCi.cs. flie omitted worers are the Low wage workers and the growing rate of omission of blacks relative to whites has led to an artifical acceleration in the measured rate of black progress. Iii short, the "evidence" cited by Freeman and Watcenberg and Scammon is flawed.
There are ocher signs that all is not well in the black community. Table 6 gives statistics on the real income gap between black and white families. It has grown in absolute terms since 1959 and the ratio has barely changed. This phenomenon arises in part from the growth of female headship among black families coupled with the near constancy of real incomes in black female households.
Although the percentage of blacks living in poverty has greatly decreased since 1959, a substantial portion of this decline is due to increased cash transfers and not the growth of employment income. As transfer programs began to be cut back in the Carter administration in 1977, the proportion of blacks living in poverty began to increase. This lack of agreement in the research community inspires little confidence in the public at large. It is disappointingly coon to observe disagreements among social scientists over issues of public policy. The confidence of the citizen in social science has diminished greatly since 1965. To empirical social scientists who believe that data can be used to settle rather inflame controversies, the apparent divergence between conflicting views on the role of government is very disturbing.
Overstatement and oversimplification ar. well rewarded activities both 8 inside and outside of academic life. Simple monolithic stories in which government does good or evil are easily grasped and attract political and financial support from partisan groups. The incentives for telling such stories are strong and the public has difficulty in assessing their merit because of the lack of access to data and the complexity of the statistical methods required to analyze it.
The rejection of social science knowledge on this issue is premature.
There is real knowledge about the impact of government on black status but the correct story does not accord with the simplistic ones told in the popular press or by the "think tanks" of the right or left whose commissioned authors selectively read the data to suit their purposes.
There is also real ignorance, however, that remains to be filled by better studies. Separattng out fact from fiction is an essential, if tedious, aspect of making studies of the impact of government on the status of blacks an intellectually respectable activity.
When we confine ourselves to the available data and recognize how it is generated and what it really measures and when empirical realities are separated from theoretical possibilities a richer, more ambiguous, picture of the role of government on the status of blacks emerges than is portrayed •in the popular literature.
In the rest of this paper I want to separate out hard knowledge from circumstantial knowledge and no knowledge at all. I want to stick to the facts and attempt to separate out hard empirical evidence from a rioristic reasoning that dominates many popular social science discussions.
I hope to convince you that contrary to the popular view there is a valid empirically based social science. In addition, I want to demonstrate the importance of understanding how the data used in recent discussions are generated. 9 In making comparisons between black and white incomes and black and white occupational status of the sort presented in Figures 1 and 2, and Tables 1 and   2 , it is important to notice that these are derived for workers in the labor force.
An important but neglected feature of the social statistics of the sort used in the recent debate over the effects of policy is that since the mid-60s, black participation in the civilian labor force has been declining. Figure 8 documents that the dropout rate for blacks has been increasing at a more rapid rate than for whites. By 1982, more than 12% of prime age black males are not in the work force and do not contribute to the earnings statistics used to measure black progress. The difficulty with the published statistics cited by , vol. 80, *398, pp, 98-132, March, 1985) . There is growing evidence of an undercount of blacks, especially economically marginal blacks.
As previously noted, this decline in black prime age male labor force activity taken in isolation appears to be anomalous--especially in view of monolithic stories that speak of the decline in the U.S. discriminatory system engineered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. If market opportunities were expanded for blacks they surely should have expanded their labor force activity--yet black labor force activity declined, even for prime age males.
One explanation of this decline that receives strong theoretical but mixed empirical support in the literature is that the decline in black male labor force activity is linked to the growth in the benefits from a variety of social ez ogras :a: ac.e no: or.ng a sore a:::ac:i.ve a.:erna:.ve :nan working, especially for low wage individuals.
The War on Poverty stressed Job training but it also offered enhanced income transfers. Benefits for all sorts of social programs exanded dramatically as Figures 9 and 10 and tables 3 and 6 reveal. Some of these programs discouraged labor force activity. Participation in disability payments programs--given to individuals who suffer from work related disabilities-expanded greatly as benefit levels rose and eligibility standards were lowered.
(See Table 3 ). Participation in these programs was proportionately higher for blacks than whites given the position of blacks in the income diszrbution.
These programs probably have had some effect on dIscouraging labor arke:
activity, but the precise magnitude of their effect is not known. Reinforcing this effect (but on much shakIer empirical grounds) is the hypothesized effect of the minimum wage on disemployment. The real minimum wage grew in magnitude through the late 60's and early 70's.
-However achieved, the removal of poor blacks from the statistical base car. and does lead to an easily misinterpreted narrowing of measured black-white income differences. The remaining working blacks ay appear to grow in ecor,orni status relatIve to whites not because any single black s doing better but because low wage black males are removed from the statistics.
This account of recent history does not deny that there has been real growth in black status relative to white status but it does argue that measurements of the growth may be exaggerated. Reinforcing this story from the other side is recent evidence of growing nonreporting of income by higher income people in the statistics which constitute the base of our knowledge. Only 2% of interviewees failed to report income in 1947 but 28% failed to report in 1982 and nonreporting rates are highest in the high income occupations. (See Lillard, Smith and Welch, 1986 ) Standard imputation procedures have been shown 11 to produce a downward bias in estimated income for such people. Because proportionately more whites are in such occupations, this factor leads to "convergence" that may well be spurious.
How serious is this issue? Like so much in social science, the issue is an empirical one. I: is a hard problem that has not received adequate attention.
In some eariLer work with Richard Butler of Brigham Young University (Butler and Heckinan, 1978) His claim is premature. By failing to account for the substantial missing Second, if all firms are bidding for contracts and the receipt of a contract is partly a matter of luck and there are many opportunities to bid for such contracts, and if it is costly to hire and fire workers--as much evidence suggests it is (see Holt, Modigliani, Muth and Simon, 1960 )--all firms--contractor or not--would look pretty much alike at any point in time even though all were hiring more blacks in response to affirmative action programs.
Comparisons across firms at a point in time would understate true affirmative action effects. Given the costs of hiring and firing, the second story appears to be more plausible than the first. knowledge--despite all of the claims pro and con--is that we still do not know the aggregate effect of these programs.
Unfortunately, the incentives to take a position on such a controversial subject are so great that the popular literature provides numerous conflicting stories. The truth of the matter, however boring it may be, is that there is no solid empirical evidence of harm from affirmative action--as Murray contends--or of great benefit either, as Scammon and 'at:enberg or Freeman contend. The most accurate si.umary of our knowledge is that we do not yet know.
Neither the affirmacve action hypothesis of government impact nor the transfer program induced labor force dropout hypothesis can account for the regional income data displayed in Figures 4-7 . Examination of these data illustrates a danger of using highly aggregated data and the benefit of considering more closely the constituent portions of an aggregated series.
The pattern of relative income growth for males that emerges from these 15 figures is as follows.
(1) In the Northwest and West regions of the United States as defined by the Census, there is no clear pattern of growth in relative incomes ( Figure 4 . and Figure 6 ).
(2) In the North Central region there is a blip upward in the 1965 period that vanishes by the lace 70s.
(3) The only steady upward trend for blacks in any region is in the South.
The uzregate 1965 blio is a consecuence of a North Central blip suverimosed on Southern trend. The story for the South is particularly important because more than 50% of the black population lives there. The regional pattern for women is similar, except that for women, the ratios are above I--suggesting superiority for black women--in all regions but the South long before 1964.
The "transparent" post-1965 shift in aggregate earnings so obvious in Figure 1 that has been the focus of so much of the discussion on relative black status vanishes in the regional d.ata. The Southern growth of black status begins before any 1ennedy.Johnson era legislation was passed--certainly before Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
A main finding of recent scholarship is that the story of black wage growth is predominately a Southern story. Migration per se has played a small role.
We are just beginning to understand the sources of the improvement of black economic position in the South. The sources appear to be three in number:
(1) A decline in agriculture and a monetization of normarket activity (people buying eggs rather than raising their own chickens etc.) as the Southern black population moved from the farm to urban and small town labor markets at a disproportionately faster rate than whites.
Some of the decline in agriculture caused workers to drop out of the work force as agriculture in the South mechanized (partly in response to labor saving technical change).
(2) Growth in industry in the South. A surprising statistic to many is that in 1980, South Carolina is the state with the highest proportton of its work force in manufacturing. In joint work (}iec1an and Payner, 1985) we have documented that newer firms and industries entering the South in the 1950s in response to tax incentives and cheap labor were color blind in their hiring practices. However, the quantitative importance of this growth on wages and employment has not yet been determined.
(3) Better investigated is the role of governmentally supplied education.
(See Smith, 1984 , Welch, 1974 The recent convergence of black-white education ratios is phenomenal by historical standards. Look at Table   7 .
The Table 9 , 97 days for blacks vs. 143 days for whites in [1929] [1930] . Classroom size was bigger, teacher salaries lower, and pupil expenditures were lower in black schools--look at panel C.
Particularly eye-opening is Table 10 which documents the discrepancy between black and white per pupil schooling expenditure in school year [1908] [1909] in Mississippi. Cohorts born during the peak of the Jim Crow era did not experience any convergence in years of schooling completed. In addition, each year of schooling was less valuable for blacks because there was less teacher input and fewer schooling days in more crowded schools.
These cohorts of black workers dominate the aggregate statistics on earnings until recently. James Smith (1984) argues that part of the post 1964 convergence of black/white status is due to the retirement of these cohortsof poorly educated workers from the labor force. These cohorts dominate the data until the l960s. This retirement phenomenon was particularly pronounced in the South and helps explain the Southern time series growth.3
Part of the Southern story of wage convergence then, is a story of foverrmental discrimination by states with long lasting consequences. Although this hypothesis cannot explain the "jump" in the aggregate data that has been the object of so much analysis, it is important to recall that the "jump" goes away in the regional data except in the North Central region. This is my interpretation and not Smith's. Smith does not perform an analysis of regional aggregates.
Although the history of exclusion of blacks from schooling is a sorry one, the evidence assembled by Smith is fundamentally optimistic. His evidence contradicts--albeit by a negative example--the claims of Freeman and Murray that government educational policies have had little effect on black status. Over the longer run, they have an important effect.
Let me conclude by summarizing the main points of this paper.
(1) Government has had an impact on the status of blacks and its impact has not always been negative. The evidence clearly shows that educational policies toward blacks have played an important role in elevating the economic status of blacks over time. The evidence on the importance of training and education on black status is not as inconsequential as many would have it.
(2) Some policies have had unintended negative effects. The available fraentary evidence suggests that some transfer programs may have had the negative effect of removing labor force incentives and stimulating the formation of female headed families.
(3) Very little reliable information is available about negative or positive effects of affirmative action programs on the status of blacks. Our evidence on this issue is at best anecdotal.
(4) A major theme of this paper is the importance of looking closely at the d.ata introduced into popular discussions and examining how they have been generated. The aggregate statistics on the time series of black status mask important regional differences and obscure developments in the South which have played and continue Co play an .mportanc role in elevating the status of blacks. The evidence from the South indicates that naive claims of the importance of the 1964
Civil Rights Acts do not receive support in the data since wages began to systematically increase in the region long before passage of this 19 law. We have also seen that the system of social statistIcs frcm which we draw our data on black status do not properly account for lower wage blacks. Part of the measured convergence of black status to white status (in relative terms) is simply due to the face ch:
poor blacks have been eliminated from the social accounti.ig system. This evidence casts a very different light on the recent measured convergence.
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